NATION

SPEECH: Professor V S Mani Memorial Lecture

Mr Chancellor; Mr Vice Chancellor; Director and Deputy Director of the School of Law and Govern­ance; Co-ordinator and members of Faculty; Staff and students of the Univer­sity; Dr Vathsala Mani,
01 Dec 2018 11:00
SPEECH: Professor V S Mani Memorial Lecture
Julian Moti

Mr Chancellor;

Mr Vice Chancellor;

Director and Deputy Director of the School of Law and Govern­ance;

Co-ordinator and members of Faculty;

Staff and students of the Univer­sity;

Dr Vathsala Mani, Dr Krishnan Mani and members of the Mani Family;

Distinguished guests;

Ladies and gentlemen;

I am pleased to greet you “Na­maste” (in Hindi); “Ni sa Bula” (in iTaukei Fijian) and “G’day” (in Australian English).

It is my good fortune to deliver this Inaugural Professor V S Mani Memorial Lecture at Jaipur Na­tional University today and I am privileged by your invitation to do so as a close friend of the hono­rand.

The institution of this lecture se­ries as an annual event in the aca­demic calendar of Jaipur National University is a deserving tribute to Late Professor Mani and another proud achievement for the Seed­ling School of Law and Govern­ance.

I commend the University and its Law School on their initiatives in staging both this annual oration and the prestigious nationwide Professor V S Mani International Law Moot Competition to immor­talise him.

This is not my first visit to your Law School and the University campus.

Your revered “Mani Sir” escorted me here on a guided tour to “catch some fresh air” on a cold winter’s afternoon way back in January 2015.

That was the last time I met Mani. His wife, Dr Vathsala and younger son, Dr Krishnan still remember the highlights of that day.

Some of those memories are pre­served in the photographs we took in front of the Law School and its courtyard.

Like this journey, my visit to the Mani residence at the City of Golden Domes here in Jaipur back in 2015 also involved a pilgrimage.

I was returning home to Fiji from Haridwar where I had just immersed the residue of my late father’s ashes in the River Ganges.

This time, I’m here to perform the final rites for the immersion of the residue of my late mother’s ashes at Haridwar.

Paying homage to Mani enroute there makes this pilgrimage par­ticularly special and emotional.

Mani obviously mattered to my family, and I’m not using his sur­name homonymously!

The Manis honoured my aged parents by spending time with us during their visit to Sydney in 2012 for the Asian Society of Interna­tional Law’s biennial conference.

I am delighted to return the fa­vour by turning up here on this pretext.

Mani’s trademark humility was why his towering reputation al­ways preceded him.

His knowledge of international law was encyclopaedic.

He remains among only a hand­ful of distinguished Indian inter­national legal scholars who have been invited to deliver lectures at the Hague Academy of Interna­tional Law in The Netherlands.

He did so in 2005 when he was Di­rector of the Gujarat National Law University.

The topic of his Hague Lecture was “Humanitarian” Intervention Today.

I’ve kept his autographed copy of the printed text in my library.

An invitation to deliver the Hague Lectures is an emblem of the pin­nacle of achievement and dis­tinction as an international legal scholar.

Mani was certainly the model par excellence of an international law­yer.

His curriculum vitae chronicles the accomplishments of his pro­fessional career as a legal scholar, practitioner and administrator spanning more than half a century.

His interests in legal issues were typically broad-ranging for the generation of academic lawyers to which he belonged.

He wrote with characteristic flair and authority on subjects that were topical and controversial as well as practical and esoteric.

More than 200 books, chapters, articles, reports, papers, pleadings and submissions bear his name in print.

I have chosen in my personal trib­ute to Mani to dwell on the two sub­jects of our common interest and specialisation by focusing on the intersection of international law and constitutional law.

This memorial lecture provides both the venue and vehicle for the first outing of some of my ideas on the transformative creed of con­stitutions of India, South Africa, Kenya and Fiji.

These nations have either adopt­ed constitutional texts or revised them to institute charters for the governance of their (invariably, re­publican and predominantly third world) polities.

A striking, though understud­ied, aspect of these constitutional manifestos is its engagement with international law and the constitu­tional regulation of their interac­tion. My modest contribution to constitutional jurisprudence seeks to find space for international law in the doctrinal foundation and development of its practices as regards the principled interpre­tation of texts which function as manifestos for the transformation of post-colonial societies.

The principle of transformative consistency, culled from the juris­prudence of both constitutional and international law, will be ex­plored as the prospective basis for rationalisation of judicial deci­sions which are both celebrated and criticised for their eclecticism.

The research, thinking and writ­ing of Mani on the broader theme of international law’s transforma­tion into national or municipal law provides the prismatic point of de­parture for my inquiries.

Our story begins in 1942.

That year commenced, on Janu­ary 1st, with the signing in Wash­ington of a Joint Declaration by USA, UK, USSR, China and 22 oth­er Allied States.

Known as the “Declaration by United Nations”, that document became the wellspring for the sub­sequent emergence in 1945 both of the Charter and the Organisation bearing its name.

The text of the Declaration obliged its signatory “Govern­ments” to pledge their cooperation “in a common struggle against sav­age and brutal forces seeking to subjugate the world”.

The scourge of Hitlerism had already “convinced” them: “that complete victory over their ene­mies is essential to defend life, lib­erty, independence and religious freedom, and to preserve human rights and justice in their own lands as well as in other lands”.

India’s inclusion among the Dec­laration’s 26 original signatories cannot be overlooked at the time when it still remained a British colony (just as it was when it be­came a founding member of the League of Nations in 1920).

(This curious anomaly of both international and British colonial law is mentioned here fleetingly to flag its ramifications for the stitch­ing of legal arrangements for In­dia’s subsequent separation, inde­pendence and statehood.)

The Declaration’s text also recited the signatories’ subscription to the Atlantic Charter embodying “the common programme of purposes and principles” agreed between Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill in August 1941.

History would record the loss in transit of the original Char­ter instrument signed by both the United States President and United Kingdom Prime Minister in Placentia Bay, Newfoundland; allowing Churchill to interpret its commitment to the principle of self-determination selectively to exclude British India and Africa from its purview.

History would also chronicle the pervasive influence of that Char­ter’s ideology in the agitation for India’s independence, the birth of the United Nations and the advent of the era of decolonisation.

Amidst the ravages of the Second World War and Indian battles for independence, 1942’s calendar ap­peared rather bleak for the village of Urugam in Kerala.

March 6th, however, offered a new horizon for the family of P S Ven­kateshwara Iyer.

That day was auspicious as well for the birth of a new vision and visionary: Venkateswara Subra­manian Mani.

As the tale of his own career would unravel, Mani’s vistas tel­escoped beyond his natal bearings without losing sight of the “glocal” battles surrounding him in utero.

Mani’s ascension to the stellar heights of India’s legal galaxy as an international lawyer could have been foretold in his formative years.

I owe to his sister, Rekha Vishalam, some revelations about young Mani which were corrobo­rated in 2005 by a much older Mani during walks with me down memo­ry lane at Gandhinagar.

Rekha recalls:

“Ours was a normal childhood, blessed with love, laughter, tiffs and tears.

With our father away on busi­ness most of the time, mother bore the burden of taking care of aged grandparents, the paddy fields and of course, us – two boys and two girls.

Mani was the eldest and next was me.

He automatically assumed the role of pater familias in father’s absence, and acted like one.

Mani was very studious, extreme­ly industrious and spared no pain in excelling academically.

Electricity came to our village in the late fifties, and the only mass media then were the newspapers.

He was an avid reader of papers and always abreast with the latest news.

That gave him an edge in general knowledge quiz competitions.

Long vacations, looked forward to by the entire village, was the time all the boys would gather in our house to plan drama perfor­mances.

The committee, under Mani’s leadership and direction, would discuss and formulate the theme, script, dialogue; select actors for the roles; before starting practice sessions.

Boys with no histrionic talents would be assigned prompting, stage management and make-up.

We little girls would be in charge of selling the tickets to the open air performance.

Who would waste money buying tickets when they could watch it for free anyway?

But we needed funds for makeup, costume, etc.

So our sales pitch became: “All the boys are working with Mani.” Predictably, Mani’s name worked like magic.

He was very popular with the village elders. “Such a nice boy”, they’d hail, “… never involved in any wrongdoing … such a pious Satvvik personality”.”

Remarkably for the wordsmith that Mani became, he came to Eng­lish later than most of us. Rekha remembers how:

“After CNN Boys School, Mani went on to attend St Thomas Col­lege in the nearby town of Trichur.

He had to labour hard there to learn and master English.

It was the first time in life we were exposed to spoken English.

Ours was a Malayalam medium school.”

Rekha attributes her own achieve­ments as an English teacher to the “spirit of fierce competition” be­tween the two siblings.

Her advice to her elder brother once to “make your sentences short, please Anna” (only because of his earlier propensity “to pack so much information in one sen­tence”) was obviously heeded in the millions of words he has left us to read and ponder.

Graduating from St Thomas Col­lege with a BA (majoring in politi­cal science and economics), Mani arrived at Cuttack, Orissa (as Odi­sha was then named).

His enrolment for a law degree at Madhusudan Law College was for­tuitous.

Mani’s father’s work as a cor­respondent for All India Law Re­porter and Madras Law Journal led him to re-settle his family at Cuttack and establish the “Cuttack Law Times”.

He had aspirations for Mani to succeed him eventually as its pub­lisher.

Mani’s cultivation of his talents in research and writing, however, inclined his interest in pursuing postgraduate legal studies to join the academic branch of the profes­sion.

With his father’s encourage­ment (premised on the prospect of Mani’s practice as an advocate of the Supreme Court at New Delhi), Mani applied for the award of a PhD scholarship at the Indian School of International Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University.

It was there he became captivated by the intellectual prowess and charm of two people who changed his destiny.

The first, and only because he met him before her, was Professor R P Anand.

The second, who became the love of his life, is Dr Vathsala Mani (nee Krishnamacharya).

Let me interrupt our story there to inject some background and context into Mani’s biography and bibliography.

Mani was only five years old when India attained its independence to become a sovereign nation state in its own right.

He was barely eight when India’s republican Constitution, formu­lated and adopted by the Constitu­ent Assembly after independence, became operative on January 26, 1950.

A glimpse of the syllabus of Mani’s undergraduate legal stud­ies during the 1960’s might tell us what we need to know about the journey of his intellectual awak­ening in the two subjects and topic addressed in the title of this lec­ture.

We must have some inkling of his knowledge of both Indian constitu­tional law and (public) internation­al law when he first encountered them to enable us to understand their metamorphosis during his lifetime at the stage he left us.

The text of India’s Constitution, as “the supreme law” of this land, provides the framework for the in­teraction of international law and national law within its federal pol­ity.

Foremost among its provisions, dealing with the preservation of existing laws until their eventual disapplication, is Article 372. It stipulates:

“Subject to the other provisions of this Constitution, all the law in force in the territory of India im­mediately before the commence­ment of this Constitution, shall continue in force therein until al­tered or repealed or amended by a competent legislature or other competent authority.”

Leaving aside its various permu­tations, the subjection of “all the law in force” to “other provisions of this Constitution” encompassed international law as “part” of the applicable common and statutory law in pre-Republican India.

Moreover, as a component ele­ment of “all the law in force” in pre-Republican India, internation­al law found to be “inconsistent with the provisions of this Part [III on Fundamental Rights] shall, to the extent of such inconsistency be void” by virtue of Article 13(1).

It was not until after Mani’s tran­sition from student to teacher, that the imperative test of constitution­al consistency and compliance be­came the emphatic concern of that formula and our learning.

Article 51 is another provision of the constitutional scheme relating to international law.

It is located in the “Directive Principles of State Policy” which, though not judicially enforceable, “are nevertheless fundamental in

the governance of the country …”

Mani echoed the general scholar­ly sentiment in pronouncing:

“… the phraseology of Article 51 indicates that its drafting leaves much to be desired.”

Judicial restraint characterised its vision of the Directive Princi­ples as non-justiciable until the 1970’s when the judiciary began to visualise itself as a constituent organ of the “State” whose “duty” it was to “apply these principles in making law.”

Courts were, thus, also compelled by Article 51(c) in the exercise of their judicial power and functions to:

“Endeavour to foster respect for international law and treaty obli­gations in the dealings of organ­ised peoples with one another …”

Ignoring prevalent drafting infe­licities, there has never been any disagreement about the meaning of various constitutional referenc­es to international law.

The standard textbooks which Mani read as a student and wrote later located the sources of inter­national law in Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) and its precur­sor.

Addressed specifically to the ICJ, “Whose function is to decide in ac­cordance with International law such disputes as are submitted to it”, Article 38(1) mandates that court to “apply” the following:

“(a) International conventions, whether general or particular, es­tablishing rules expressly recog­nised by the contesting states;

(b) International custom, as evi­dence of a general practice accept­ed as law;

(c) The general principles of law recognised by civilized nations;

(d) The subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most high­ly qualified publicists of the vari­ous nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.”

That catalogue of the universal­ly-recognised sources of interna­tional law (while admittedly not exhaustive) contextualises the reasons for express constitutional regulation of the Republic’s re­sponsibility for the making and implementation of treaties by its executive and legislative organs.

Consonant with Commonwealth practice, while India adheres to the monistic tradition in applying customary international law as part of Indian common law, by vir­tue of Articles 73 (which entrusts treaty making capacity to the Union executive) and 253 (which confers legislative power for their implementation to the Union Par­liament), the theory of dualism undergirds Indian treaty practice.

The only point I need to make (just because Mani has covered all the other aspects of treaty mak­ing and implementation in his writing) is that the constitutional division of labour has allocated responsibility for transformation of Indian law by international law to parliamentary control of execu­tive initiative, under judicial scru­tiny for constitutional compliance and consistency.

Mani’s postgraduate legal studies in New Delhi during the 1960’s and 1970’s located him close to the epi­centre of the tectonic shifts in In­dian constitutional jurisprudence from its immediate post-independ­ence, positivist, black-letter, textu­alist moorings to what Professor Sathe has labelled as “structural­ist” and might also be described in hindsight as “eclectic”.

That era marked the dawn of the transition from jurisprudence to “demosprudence” (to borrow Pro­fessor Baxi’s term); situating In­dia’s apex judiciary in the engine room of societal transformation by their enlightened sensitivity.

Research for his PhD thesis on “Procedure before International Tribunals” took Mani to the UK to unearth archival materials.

Shortly after his return, a fateful encounter with Vathsala (who was then working with Professor Rah­matullah Khan on the internation­al payments regime in internation­al trade law) blossomed a romance.

With their parents’ blessings, Vathsala eventually became Mrs Mani and the mother of their two sons: Venkatesh and Krishnan.

As his soulmate for over half a century, credit must be given to Dr Vathsala for making Mani pos­sible.

The acknowledgments page of every book he has written testifies to the enormous debt he owed Dr Vathsala for her selfless sacrifice of everything she could have been, become and done.

Her presence here at this inaugu­ral lecture dedicated to his mem­ory and legacy allows me to pay deserving tribute to her as well on behalf of all his friends in the global community of international lawyers.

Mani’s scholarship straddled the entire canvas of international law.

He belonged to that generation of academics, fast becoming an extinct species, who professed ex­pertise in every aspect of our dis­cipline’s stock in trade.

He had cut his teeth in the employ of the Indian Society of Interna­tional Law as a research and teach­ing assistant before entering the groves of academe at Jawaharlal Nehru University.

His prodigious industry and en­viable reputation as a teacher fetched him tenured professorial posts there in record time.

Mani was also a rare breed among legal academics.

Such is the vocation of interna­tional lawyers that it is not un­common for those who inhabit the academic branch of our profession to practise what they preach and, thereby, learn to unlearn what they teach.

Armed with a doctorate qualify­ing him as a specialist in inter­national legal practice and proce­dure, a published monograph on International Adjudication: Proce­dural Aspects and itchy feet, Mani seized the once-in-a lifetime oppor­tunity he was given in 1981 to end up in my part of the world.

For someone who lacked any trait of ambition, Mani rose from the junior rank of a State Counsel of the tiny island Republic of Nauru to become its Presidential Counsel and Chief Secretary.

Nauru’s pursuit of its claim against Australia in the ICJ is the reason I first became acquainted with Mani.

Those proceedings captioned Cer­tain Phosphate Lands in Nauru Case was Mani’s brainchild.

Nauru’s victory in the prelimi­nary phase of that case and even­tual settlement out of court was certainly a feather in Mani’s cap as Nauru’s Agent and Counsel.

Little wonder then that he was conscripted by Attorney General Soli Sorabjee as Consultant Coun­sel for the Indian legal team in two cases instituted by and against Pa­kistan in the ICJ.

We both played our respective roles for Nauru and Solomon Is­lands in reviewing the ICJ plead­ings for the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons Case.

My itinerant stints as a Visiting Professorial Fellow at Jawaharlal Nehru University from 2004 to 2006 provided us with the opportunity to renew our friendship at his new abode in Gandhinagar and in his new role as founding Director of the Gujarat National Law Univer­sity. In his company I had the good fortune to meet his effective boss, the Chief Minister of the State of Gujarat (as he then was) and ven­ture my mischievous ruminations on the impending “Modification” of India.

Playing on words, even if it meant capitalising on the surname of the current Prime Minister, gave us both great delight.

Mani is probably having the last laugh today considering the syno­nymity of the word “Modifica­tion” with my choice of the term “Transformative” in the title of my lecture!

This is perhaps the perfect junc­ture to exploit two more puns (this time on Mani’s surname) and pick up the threads of my argument re­garding the transformative mani­festations of international law in constitutional manifestos.

My exploration is undertaken against the backdrop of the recent series of landmark verdicts pro­nounced by India’s Supreme Court on rights to privacy as well as sex­ual intimacy to invalidate colonial laws criminalising sodomy and adultery.

Those seminal judgments, along with countless others, descending from its apex court during the past few decades amply illustrate that India is not alone among postco­lonial nations grappling with the alignment of their existing laws with international norms to fulfil their transformative constitution­al mandates.

Long before its advent in the legal lexicon via South Africa’s post-apartheid constitutional dispensa­tions (in the form of its 1993 Inter­im and 1996 Final Constitutions), “transformative constitutional­ism” as a phenomenon, project and practice (without that name) described the leitmotif of several national constitutions whose texts were inscribed with the language of emancipatory promise and rev­olutionary potential.

The Preamble to India’s Consti­tution (which was adopted by the Constituent Assembly sixty nine years ago on this coming Monday) contains the desideratum of a na­tion in scripture that defines and defies its people.

A “living constitution” as India’s has always been regarded, and now rendered eternal by judicial decree (since the adoption of the basic structure doctrine), its trans­formative vision and actualisation must remain forever an incom­plete and unconcluded project.

That realisation is what makes such a criticism constructive.

Professor Karl Klare has defined “transformative constitutional­ism” as:

“A long-term project of constitu­tional enactment, interpretation and enforcement committed (not in isolation, of course, but in a his­torical context of conducive politi­cal developments) to transforming a country’s political and social in­stitutions and power relationships in a democratic, participatory and egalitarian direction.”

It is a project requiring a shift from a “culture of authority” to a “culture of justification”.

A constancy of change is implicit in the term “transformative”.

The concept, admittedly, is of both capacious and contentious content.

Professor Laurie Ackermann, a former Justice of South Africa’s Constitutional Court, prefers in­stead to use the term “substantive constitutional revolution.”

Recent scholarship in Indian con­stitutional history has revisited the foundational moments of the Republic’s birth to reassess its rev­olutionary claims. In the history of revolutions, the formulation, adoption and promulgation of con­stitutions is a triumphat moment celebrating the achievement of the revolution as a fait accompli.

Constitutions usually mark the culmination or end of revolutions and institutionalise the new social and political order.

They contain the documentary embodiment and imprimatur of the transformation resulting from the revolution.

That history and logic were in­verted when India’s Constitution became effective following its formulation and adoption by the Constituent Assembly more than two years after gaining formal in­dependence.

The uniqueness of India’s consti­tutional experiment and experi­ence cannot be dismissed casually as another instance of Indian ex­ceptionalism.

It revolutionises our thinking about what constitutions can and should do.

Reference to the aspirational creed embodied in the Objectives Resolution and translated into the Constitution’s Preamble and substantive text, when analysed from the perspectives of those who contributed to their framing, dem­onstrate why India’s Constitution is written as a manifesto for the transformation of the socio-politi­cal order.

In the Indian constitutional im­agination, the metamorphosis of India was viable and attain­able through a constitutionally-designed path.

India’s transformation remains the revolution promised by its Con­stitution.

From that very simplified and somewhat simplistic reinterpreta­tion of Indian constitutional his­tory, let me return to my earlier references to some of the consti­tutional provisions which set the stage for my ensuing argument regarding the transformative role envisaged for international law in “secur[ing] to all” Indian “citi­zens” the Constitution’s preambu­lar commitments to:

n “JUSTICE, social, economic and political;

n LIBERTY of thought, expres­sion, belief, faith and worship;

n EQUALITY of status and of opportunity; and to promote among them all

n FRATERNITY assuring the dig­nity of the individual and the unity and integrity of the Na­tion.”

I need not labour the point about Article 372’s express subjection to the Constitution of “all laws in force” in pre-Republican India (in­cluding international law existing as “part” of applicable common and statutory law).

Constitutional compliance dic­tates incompatible laws to be ren­dered void to the extent of their inconsistency with fundamental rights guarantees.

Future laws must also pass con­stitutional muster on the basis ar­ticulated in Article 13(2).

The visualisation of India’s trans­formation as its constitutional pro­ject requires the refinement of our vision and conception of the judi­ciary’s adjudicative role and func­tion in that equation.

Courts invested with the “judicial power of the people” can only ful­fil their transforming functions as an institutional organ of the State when they realise their traditional roles have been transformed by their constituent instrument.

Their constitutional oaths of of­fice, prescribed by Sections 124(6) and 219 in the form contained in the Third Schedule, require Su­preme and High Court judges to either “swear in the name of God” or “solemnly affirm” that:

“I will bear true faith and alle­giance to the Constitution … that I will uphold the sovereignty and integrity of India, that I will duly and faithfully and to the best of my ability, knowledge and judgment perform the duties of my office without fear or favour, affection or ill-will and that I will uphold the Constitution and the laws.”

Fidelity to their oaths exercises judicial minds in constant navel-gazing.

Indian judgments usually have a good deal to say, sometimes at greater length than might be judi­cious, about the values that are ex­pressly or impliedly protected and promoted by the Constitution.

Indian judges roam far and wide in their search for learning about the legal meaning and effect of constitutional terminology.

I happen to think there is nothing wrong with that exercise.

Once we accept the genealogy of post-colonial constitutional texts as bricolages or cut-and-paste bor­rowings of bits and pieces from what is available elsewhere, it does not require a leap of imagination and faith to seek enlightenment from the explication of their un­derstood meaning.

If the result of such judicial ex­plorations and excavations has produced an eclectic collection of judgments which, though untidy, cannot be faulted for their attempts to promote transformative consist­ency, the clue to their rationalisa­tion may be found outside the doc­trinal realm of national law.

I venture to suggest that Indian judgments are travelling on the correct doctrinal path, perhaps unwittingly, by embracing the ju­ristic role and function of the judi­ciary as a component organ of the “State” equally bound as such un­der international law in interpret­ing, applying and enforcing laws which their own nation states are obliged to follow.

On reflection, this requirement is simply the illustration of the oper­ation of the principle of the “unity of the State” in international legal theory.

With that acknowledgement, let me revert to my earlier reference to Article 38(1) of the Statute of the ICJ to find and fill the missing pieces of the jigsaw puzzle.

Constitutional texts, statutes and national judgments function as ev­idence both of usus or state prac­tice and opinio juris of customary international law, embody general principles of international law and are sources of international law in their own right as judicial decisions.

As such, their influence and impact on the genesis of the in­terpretational principle of trans­formative consistency and its application, particularly in post-colonial contexts, can hardly be ignored.

The neglect can no longer remain unremedied.

Resort to international law should not be reserved to situations re­sulting from the discovery of tex­tual ambiguity, as has become the practice elsewhere.

Transformative consistency’s promise as principle rests on the elementary truth propounded long ago by Gaius in the Institutes of the Justinian and encapsulated as the jus gentium:

“[E]very community governed by laws and customs uses partly its own law, partly laws common to all [hu]mankind.”

If I have rambled on a bit more than I should have, it is because my conversations with Mani were always interminable.

Mani, of course, wouldn’t have let me apologise for speaking my mind.

I leave you to draw your own con­clusions from today’s enterprise.

Thank you for your kind atten­tion and invitation.

Feedback: jyotip@fijisun.com.fj

Fijisun E-edition
Advertise with fijisun
Subscribe-to-Newspaper
Fiji Sun Instagram
Fiji Plus
Subscribe-to-Newspaper
error: